Looking across human societies reveals regularities in the languages that people speak and the concepts that they use. One explanation that has been proposed for these ''cultural universals'' is differences in the ease with which people learn particular languages and concepts. A difference in learnability means that languages and concepts possessing a particular property are more likely to be accurately transmitted from one generation of learners to the next. Intuitively, this difference could allow languages and concepts that are more learnable to become more prevalent after multiple generations of cultural transmission. If this is the case, the prevalence of languages and concepts with particular properties can be explained simply by demonstrating empirically that they are more learnable. We evaluate this argument using mathematical analysis and behavioral experiments. Specifically, we provide two counter-examples that show how greater learnability need not result in a property becoming prevalent. First, more learnable languages and concepts can nonetheless be less likely to be produced spontaneously as a result of transmission failures. We simulated cultural transmission in the laboratory to show that this can occur for memory of distinctive items: these items are more likely to be remembered, but not generated spontaneously once they have been forgotten. Second, when there are many languages or concepts that lack the more learnable property, sheer numbers can swamp the benefit produced by greater learnability. We demonstrate this using a second series of experiments involving artificial language learning. Both of these counter-examples show that simply finding a learnability bias experimentally is not sufficient to explain why a particular property is prevalent in the languages or concepts used in human societies: explanations for cultural universals based on cultural transmission need to consider the full set of hypotheses a learner could entertain and all of the kinds of errors that can occur in transmission.
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A comparison of how people speak and think across human societies reveals some surprising regularities. To give two examples, the syntax of human languages shows less variability than might be expected if languages were simply arbitrary communication schemes (Greenberg, 1963; Comrie, 1981; Croft, 2002) , and religious concepts seem to follow a common schema (being ''minimally counterintuitive'') in a range of societies (Boyer, 1994) . The existence of these cultural universals raises a natural question: Where do they come from? What makes particular languages or concepts more likely to appear in a society? Recent work has explored a possible answer to this question, based on differences in the ease with which languages and concepts are transmitted from person to person (e.g., Boyer, 1994 Boyer, , 2001 Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Culbertson, 2012; Finley & Badecker, 2007; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 
